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Classic and contemporary researchers have studied the child’s abilities to discriminate 
quantitative values, understand probability, and appreciate risk and uncertainty. The 
current studies were designed to extend and methodologically integrate recent 
insights that have been made across these sub-areas. A computerized decision-making 
task, which allows manipulation of probability of success and quantitative outcome 
value, was developed. In the first study, this task was used to analyze the 
development of preference between options with systematically contrasted numerical 
outcome values. Contrary to recent research, this study revealed that participants, and 
particularly younger children (i.e., five- and six-year-olds), tend to neglect 
quantitative outcome value information, and seem to base choices primarily on 
probability information. In the second study, the task was used to assess the 
  
 development of preference between options with systematically contrasted 
probabilities of success. Consistent with recent research, this study revealed that even 
young participants attend to differences in probability of success between decision 
alternatives; however, younger participants seemed less able to explicitly integrate 
decision outcomes, as assessed by more explicit measures of probability 
understanding. In the third study, probability of success was again manipulated, but 
wins were combined with losses. This study revealed, like Study 2, that children 
adjusted preference as a function of probability of success; however, consistent with 
Study 1, this study revealed that children tend to neglect outcome values. Cross-study 
analyses were conducted which further demonstrated that decision-making 
probabilities loom larger than outcome values. Collectively, these studies suggest that 
processing of probabilities developmentally precedes processing of quantitative 
outcome values, and that implicit processing developmentally precedes explicit 
decision integration. In the conclusion these findings and possible future directions 
are discussed. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Traditionally, cognitive developmental research has been conducted with an 
underlying assumption that younger children are less cognitively proficient than older 
children, adolescents, and adults. For instance, studies have demonstrated that with 
age come more sophisticated cognitive representations (Mandler, 1998), improved 
reasoning (DeLoache, Miller, & Pierroutsakos, 1998), more efficient strategies 
(Siegler, 1996), greater processing speed (Kail & Salthouse, 1994), increased working 
memory capacity, superior memory strategies (Ornstein, Haden, & Hedrick, 2004; 
Schneider & Bjorklund, 1998), and improved metacognition (Flavell, 1999; Flavell & 
Miller, 1998; Kuhn, Garcia-Mila, Zohar, & Andersen, 1995). Each of these cognitive 
developments is likely related to the development of decision-making; however, quite 
recently the development of decision-making has emerged as a distinct area of study, 
with a unique set of empirical and theoretical issues (Byrnes, 1998; Furby & Beyth-
Marom, 1992; Galotti, 2001; Klaczynski, Byrnes, & Jacobs, 2001).  
In fact, many now argue that the abilities to interpret uncertain and potentially 
risky situations, and make wise decisions, are among the most important skills one 
develops (Beyth-Marom, Austin, Fischhoff, Palmgren, & Quadrel, 1993; Byrnes, 
1998; Furby & Beyth-Marom, 1992; Garon & Moore, 2004; Halpern-Felsher & 
Cauffman, 2001; Irwin, 1993; Mann, Harmoni, & Power, 1989). It is also recognized 
from other perspectives (e.g., federal and educational policy making and naïve 
parenting) that the decisions children and adolescents make have the potential for 
significant consequences. Reciprocally, child and adolescent decision-making 
research has been implicated in debates on adolescent rights, health care, and criminal 
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culpability (Cauffman & Steinberg, 2000a; 200b; Fried & Reppucci, 2001; Irwin, 
Igra, Eyre, & Millstein, 1997; Ozer, MacDonald, & Irwin, 2002; Steinberg & Scott, 
2003; Wilcox, 1993). Unfortunately, however, relatively little is known of the 
development of the precise cognitive processes that underlie decision-making skills.  
Developmental issues aside, the component processes people invoke when put in 
decision situations have been analyzed for centuries. Decision alternatives are 
oftentimes conceptualized as composed of potential positive and negative values 
(costs and benefits), and probabilities that either the positive or negative values will 
be realized if the alternative is chosen and implemented (Bernoulli, 1738/1954; Luce 
& Raiffa, 1957; Savage, 1954; von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944). Using this 
behavioral decision theory perspective, individuals are assumed to estimate how 
desirable an alternative’s benefits might be, how expensive the its costs might be, the 
probability of either occurring, and consequently, its expected value. In this sense, 
decision options have an expected value, which may be quantified as the sum of the 
products of the probabilities and values of potential outcomes. Contemporary 
cognitive decision-making research has moved well beyond analysis of individuals’ 
use of expected values; however, many contemporary descriptive accounts, such as 
cumulative prospect theory and rank and sign dependent interpretations of axiomatic 
utility theory, explain decision-making in terms of subjective evaluations of outcome 
probabilities and values (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Luce, 1991; Luce & Fishburn, 
1991; 1995; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). Furthermore, in order to understand how 
basic decision-making abilities develop, one must consider how the most basic 
understanding of probability and outcome value information develop. Thus, the next 
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sections of this paper will review the research that has considered the child’s 
understanding of quantitative outcome value information and probability.  
The Child’s Understanding of Quantitative Outcome Values 
As introduced, behavioral decision theory approaches generally propose that 
outcome values, the degree of satisfaction associated with potential outcomes, 
influence human choice. In traditional decision-making research, outcome values are 
typically quantified as money or a number of prizes or points that a research 
participant can garner through choices made or gambles taken. Unfortunately, very 
little previous research has analyzed the child’s sensitivity to quantitative outcome 
values in decision situations. What little research there is on the topic suggests that 
from a relatively young age (i.e., five-years) children appreciate that outcomes that 
are associated with higher values (i.e., more points or prizes) are preferable to 
outcomes that are associated with lower values (Schlottmann, 2000; 2001; 
Schlottmann & Anderson, 1994). For instance, Schlottmann (2001) presented five- 
through 12-year-old participants with a series of gambles and asked them to rate the 
quality of each gamble. A controlled subset of these gambles differed in terms of the 
number of prizes that could be won. The results provide compelling evidence that 
even the youngest participants (five- to seven-year-olds) attend to quantitative 
differences in potential prizes, and adjust preferences accordingly. The results, 
however, also revealed significant differences between younger participants (i.e., 
five- to seven-year-olds) and older participants (i.e., eight- to 12-year-olds), in that 
older participants’ preferences were slightly more consistent with normative expected 
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value predictions, and older participants were more likely to attend to smaller 
quantitative differences.  
Although only a limited number of studies have examined children’s abilities to 
differentiate lower vs. higher outcome values in decision-making situations, a very 
rich literature has considered the development of more basic quantitative skills. 
Classic research proposed that children have limited quantitative understanding until 
the late preschool years. Piaget’s number conservation experiments, for instance, 
demonstrated that preschoolers (i.e., three- to four-years) do not comprehend that 
altering the spatial arrangement of a number of objects (i.e., spreading several objects 
out vs. bunching them up together) actually has no bearing on the quantity of the 
objects (Piaget 1941/1965). Slightly older children (i.e., five- to seven-years), on the 
other hand, are able to conserve number after spatial manipulation. Piaget 
(1941/1965) therefore argued that quantitative competence is not achieved until 
number conservation is mastered. 
More recent work, however, has challenged the notion that preschool children are 
quantitatively incompetent. Gelman and Gallistel (1978), for instance, documented 
several counting principles that children as young as two-and-a-half-years use. That 
is, although they do not yet understand the appropriate conventional labels to apply to 
a series of objects (they do not use “one” = 1, “two” = 2, etc.) by two-and-a-half -
years children apply a unique label to every object in an array that is being counted 
(i.e., the one-one principle), they apply labels in the same order across counting 
episodes (i.e., the stable-order principle), and they differentiate the last label in a 
sequence from the previous labels as indicating the total count (i.e., the cardinality 
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principle). Thus, use of these “how-to-count” principles is presented as evidence that 
preschool children have greater quantitative competence than previous research 
supposed (Gelman & Gallistel, 1978). Similarly, others have found that preschool-
aged children (i.e., two-and-a-half- to four-year-olds) can successfully negotiate non-
verbal calculation tasks with small numerical sets prior to mastering conventional 
mathematical skills (Huttenlocher, Jordan, & Levine, 1994; Levine, Jordan, & 
Huttenlocher, 1992; Mix, 1999). This is not to say that preschoolers’ mastery of 
quantitative operations and principles is complete. On the contrary, several notable 
quantitative developments occur in the preschool period, between three- and five-
years. These include a gradual increase in the accuracy with which children perform 
mathematical operations, an increase in the set sizes to which children can apply 
operations, and an increase in the degree to which children can abstract quantitative 
information and apply it to novel situations (Mix, Huttenlocher, & Levine, 2002). By 
four- or five-years, however, children typically have a repertoire of several strategies 
for performing mathematical operations (Siegler, 1996). 
Others have gone a step further and have claimed that even infants have notable 
quantitative abilities. Using the habituation design, in which variability in participant 
looking time is used as a metric of cognitive discrimination, a number of studies have 
demonstrated that very young infants can differentiate small quantitative sets  (Antell 
& Keating, 1983; Starkey & Cooper, 1980; Strauss & Curtis, 1981; Wynn, 1998). 
Antell and Keating  (1983), for instance, habituated newborns to an array (i.e., either 
2, 3, 4 or 6 dots on a card), then assessed looking time at an array of different 
numerosity (i.e., 3, 2, 6, or 4 dots at test). The results suggest that newborns can 
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discriminate small numerical sets (i.e., they look longer during test when an array had 
changed from 2 to 3 dots, or from 3 to 2 dots), but have difficulty discriminating 
arrays that display larger quantities (i.e., looking times do not change from 
habituation to test when the array changed from 4 to 6 dots, or 6 to 4 dots). Starkey 
and Cooper (1980) found precisely the same results with slightly older children (i.e., 
four-month-olds), and Strauss and Curtis (1981) found similar results with richer 
visual arrays and even older children (i.e., 10- to 12-month-olds). Some even argue 
that infants are able to make simple calculations (i.e., they are perceptive of basic 
addition and subtraction operations). Wynn (1992; 1998), for example, showed five-
month-olds an object (i.e., a doll), which was then hidden behind an opaque screen. 
While the initial object was hidden the infant saw the experimenter add another object 
(i.e., another doll) to the array. The screen was then lowered to reveal the 
quantitatively correct outcome (i.e., two dolls) or a quantitatively incorrect outcome 
(i.e., a single doll). The results revealed that participants looked significantly longer at 
the incorrect than the correct outcome, which is argued to be evidence that they had 
performed a basic addition calculation. These habituation findings, however, have not 
been without criticism; specifically, attempts at replication have been mixed (Langer, 
Gillette, & Arriaga, 2003; Wakeley, Rivera, & Langer, 2000a; 2000b), and some have 
argued that these studies confound numerical discrimination with more basic visual 
discrimination of spatial coverage (Clearfield & Mix, 1999; Mix, Huttenlocher, & 
Levine, 2002). These criticisms notwithstanding, studies of infant abilities have 
contributed to our understanding of early quantitative development, and are relevant 
for the development of sensitivity to quantitative outcome values. 
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The current studies were designed in part to extend what is known of the 
development of sensitivity to quantitative outcome values. Given the above reviewed 
research, it is predicted that the school-aged participants in the current studies will 
acknowledge differences in quantitative outcome values, and will adjust preferences 
accordingly. More specifically, it is predicted that participants in the current studies 
will consistently choose options with superior outcome values over those with 
inferior outcome values.  
The Child’s Understanding of Probability 
A fair number of studies have considered the development of probability 
understanding. Early theory and research proposed that children are unable to 
understand probability until the later childhood years (Brainerd, 1981; Piaget & 
Inhelder, 1951/1975). Recent experimental studies, on the other hand, have found that 
relatively young children attend to probability, and even use probability to guide 
preference (e.g., Acredolo, O’Connor, Banks, & Horobin, 1989; Kuzmak & Gelman, 
1986; Schlottmann & Anderson, 1994; Schlottmann, 2001). In what follows, the 
classic approaches, the contemporary approach, and potential methodological and 
theoretical sources of their differences are reviewed. 
Classic Approaches  Piaget and Inhelder (1951/1975) proposed that children do not 
understand probability until formal operational thought is achieved, around 12-years. 
To support this assertion, Piaget and Inhelder (1951/1975) used a number of 
experimental tasks (e.g., they asked children to make predictions of random draws 
from one location, random draws from two locations, and random vs. non-random 
mixture). Collectively, the results of these tasks supported Piaget’s comprehensive 
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theory of developmental stages: younger children (around five-years) erred 
dramatically and could not differentiate certain from random events; slightly older 
children (eight- to ten-years) succeeded in initial trials, but erred on subsequent trials; 
and older children (around 10-12 years) demonstrated understanding of chance.  
A number of other experimental studies have found similar age trends, thus 
supporting the Piagetian theoretical explanation. For example, Hoemann and Ross 
(1971) presented children with circular disks that had systematically varied color 
portions, and asked child participants (four- to 13-year-olds) to pick the disk with the 
higher proportion of a color (proportion group), or to pick the disk, that if spun, 
would be more likely to result in a given color (probability group). The general 
findings were that younger children were less able than older children to pick the 
color with the higher probability, although all could perceive proportional color 
differences. Similarly, Kreitler and Kreitler (1986) tested child understanding of 
random mixture, random distribution, random drawing, and possible permutations. 
Consistent with Piaget, Kreitler and Kreitler (1986) found a domain-general increase 
in abilities with age.  
As was the case across a number of cognitive developmental research areas, an 
information processing approach emerged as an alternative to the Piagetian account. 
Generally, those who adopted this perspective subdivided Piaget and colleagues’ 
explanatory constructs into detailed processes (Bjorklund, 2000; Kerkman & Wright, 
1988; Klahr & MacWhinney, 1998; Siegler & Alibali, 2005). Whereas Piaget 
attributed the failures of young children on experimental tasks to a vaguely defined 
lack of understanding, those adopting an information processing perspective proposed 
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that other, more specific mechanisms develop (e.g., processing capacity, working 
memory, and strategies), thus enabling older children to succeed in instances where 
younger children fail. As Reyna and Brainerd (1994) note, the Piagetian and 
information processing approaches are not radically different; the latter simply adds 
details to the general propositions of the former.  
Brainerd (1981), for instance, proposed that sufficient working memory capacity, 
which increases with age, is necessary for probability understanding. More 
specifically, Brainerd (1981) proposed that storage of initial frequencies, retrieval of 
previous responses and sampled items, and integration of initial frequencies and 
sampled items are necessary for processing probability. To test this Brainerd (1981) 
presented children with an experimental task that involved making a sequence of 
draws from containers that held varying ratios of items. The results supported the 
proposal. That is, although younger participants were able to recall initial frequencies, 
they could not maintain the information in working memory to make probability-
based predictions, and were unable to adjust frequencies with subsequent draws.  
Falk and Wilkening (1998) also adopted an information processing perspective, 
and designed a two-location drawing task to assess the strategies children use to 
process probability. In this task children (six- to 13-year-olds) were shown two 
transparent containers, the first containing some ratio of two different colored objects 
(e.g., 2 blue and 3 yellow beads), the second containing a different number of just one 
of the colored objects (e.g., 6 yellow beads). The child’s task was to add the excluded 
colored objects (e.g., blue beads) to the second container so as to preserve the ratio 
from the first container (e.g., to add 4 blue beads to the second container). Falk and 
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Wilkening (1998) emphasized probability (as opposed to mere proportions), by 
telling participants that they themselves would draw from one of the two containers, 
the experimenter would draw from the other, and whoever drew a winning color 
would win a prize. The findings were that the youngest participants (six- to eight-
years) tended to use a less sophisticated one-dimensional strategy (i.e., they focused 
on a single pertinent variable, such as the number of winning beads in the initial 
container), somewhat older participants (eight- to 10-years) tended to use a more 
advanced difference strategy (i.e., they focused on the difference between win and 
lose beads in the initial container), and the oldest participants (10- to 13-years) tended 
to use the most sophisticated proportion strategy (i.e., they focused on the relative 
proportions of win and loss beads). Similarly, Dean and Mollaison (1986) found that 
older children are more likely to use more sophisticated calculation strategies than 
younger children. In total, the contribution of those using the information processing 
approach has been increased specification of the mechanisms by which probability 
understanding develops. 
The Contemporary Approach  A contemporary approach refutes the Piagetian 
and information processing findings that young children are unable to understand 
probability (Acredolo et al. 1989; Kuzmak & Gelman, 1986; Schlottmann & 
Anderson, 1994; Schlottmann, 2001). Kuzmak and Gelman (1986), for instance, 
challenged the Piagetian proposal that young children are unable to differentiate 
certain from possible events, which was tested with invention of a marble cage and 
marble tube task. The marble cage was a spherical wire cage containing marbles that 
could be spun to mix its contents (similar to a bingo hopper). The marble tube was a 
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transparent plastic tube apparatus in which marbles lined up one by one. Each 
apparatus had a release mechanism that dispensed one of the marbles from the 
interior. Whereas dispensing from the spun marble cage was random, dispensing from 
the marble tube was certain. Kuzmak and Gelman (1986) presented young children 
(four- to seven-year-olds) with each apparatus and asked if they knew what color 
marble would be dispensed. The results were that children, independent of age, 
accurately responded that “yes,” they did know what the next marble would be to exit 
the tube, and “no,” they did not know the next marble that would exit the cage. Thus, 
Kuzmak and Gelman (1986) concluded that even 4-year-olds distinguish random 
from determined events, and therefore have some probabilistic sense.  
Several other contemporary studies have used comparable experimental methods, 
have found similar results, and have drawn common conclusions (Acredolo et al. 
1989; Schlottmann & Anderson, 1994; Schlottmann, 2001). With these studies 
participants were asked to generate an expected value, by rating a character’s 
happiness on a non-numerical scale, when the character is faced with events of 
varying probability and value. Acredolo et al. (1989) presented two tasks to first- 
through fifth-grade participants. On the first task an experimenter showed the child 
bags of jellybean candies, one at a time, with various proportions of jellybean colors. 
The child was then asked to predict how happy another child, who liked a certain 
color of jellybean, would be to draw from each particular bag. On the second task, the 
child interacted with a computer game that displayed a bug character and several pots 
that the bug was attempting to jump into or avoid. The ratios of desirable to 
undesirable pots were manipulated, and the child was asked how happy the bug 
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would be given various pot ratios. These tasks are comparable to the Piagetian single-
location task in that a single ratio is presented and the child is asked to make a 
judgment. Contrary to Piaget, however, Acredolo et al. (1989) found that children 
between first- and fifth-grade could accurately and consistently attend to variations in 
the ratios of desired and total variables, could translate these probabilities into 
expected values, and therefore, demonstrated understanding of probability.  
Schlottmann and Anderson (1994) and Schlottmann (2001) also asked children to 
derive probability-based expected values. In one task participants were shown 
circular disks that could be spun to win prizes, with systematically varied color 
portions. One of the colors was designated as the winning color, and children were to 
predict how happy a character would be to gamble with each disk. This method is 
structurally similar to that of Hoemann and Ross (1971) in that disks with variable 
color portions are used, and is conceptually similar to the Piagetian single location 
drawing task in that probability was considered from a sole target. In another task, 
Schlottmann (2001) presented children with a transparent tube, the back of which was 
lined with a strip of paper with systematically varied color portions (i.e., 4/5 blue, and 
1/5 yellow). This tube contained a single marble. In each trial, each color at the back 
of the tube was paired with a prize value (e.g., the blue portions were associated with 
winning 8 prizes, the yellow were associated with winning 2 prizes). Participants 
were told that as the tube was shaken, and the marble came to rest in front of one of 
the colors, a character would win the prize associated with the color. Again, children 
were to predict how happy a character would be with the gamble given the 
proportions of color and prize values. As discussed above, children adjusted 
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preferences as a function of the outcome value associated with the gamble, and more 
relevant to the current discussion, participants also adjusted preferences as a function 
of the probability of success associated with the gamble. “Overall, in contrast to the 
traditional view, the present results demonstrate functional understanding of 
probability and expected value in children as young as 5 or 6” (Schlottmann, 2001, p. 
103). Collectively, these recent studies refute the classic approaches, and claim that 
very young children can demonstrate probabilistic competence.  
There are three potential explanations for the difference between the classic and 
contemporary studies. First, a case might be made that contemporary theorists use 
simplified procedures, which enable the child to succeed. The key to this argument is 
that by introducing an expected value response mechanism, (e.g., having participant 
respond in terms of a character’s emotional state), the contemporary studies make the 
tasks more “real,” or intuitive, to the child. This argument, however, is flawed in two 
ways. First, and most basically, the traditional and contemporary methods are not 
radically different; in fact, each contemporary method is quite analogous to a 
traditional method. For instance, whereas Piaget and Inhelder (1951/1975) asked 
children which of two locations was more likely to produce a given object, Kuzmak 
and Gelman (1986) asked children to consider which of two apparatuses would 
produce a random or known outcome. Similarly, whereas Piaget and Inhelder 
(1951/1975) asked children which outcome was most likely given a single ratio 
gamble, Acredolo et al. (1989), Schlottmann and Anderson (1994), and Schlottmann 
(2001) asked children how happy a character would be with a single ratio gamble. 
These relatively analogous methods do not seem dissimilar enough to produce the 
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vast disparity in the contemporary and traditional conclusions. Secondly, the 
contemporary studies actually require the child to process more than the classic 
studies (i.e., ratios, probabilities, and a character’s probable emotional state). Of 
course, an increase in information implies greater complexity, and greater probability 
of error. Younger participants (e.g., five-year-olds), however, were more able to 
demonstrate systematic competence with the contemporary methodologies than the 
classic, due to, or perhaps despite of, the added information.  
Another methodological explanation of the difference in findings, which is more 
difficult to dismiss, is that the contemporary methodologies simply obtain more 
information from the participant, which allows richer analysis of abilities. Whereas 
the classic studies presented the participant with a forced choice between options (i.e., 
what counter will be drawn, which spinner has a higher probability of success, how 
many counters are necessary to maintain equal probability), the contemporary studies 
present analysis of the degree of preference the child has of each option (i.e., how 
valuable is this spinner, tube, or ratio of objects). As such, the contemporary studies 
allow reflection on the participant’s estimation of value of all options, rather than 
preference between options, and in this sense, provides a more sensitive assessment 
of the degree of the child’s understanding.  
The differences between the contemporary and classical findings, however, might 
also be explained theoretically. Furthermore, if it is conceded that the methods used 
in the contemporary and traditional research are not truly very different, a theoretical 
explanation may be more appropriate than a purely methodological one. Perhaps the 
key theoretical difference between the contemporary and traditional studies derives 
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from incongruent definitions of probability “understanding.” Whereas the 
contemporary studies assess intuitive and graded use of probability, the classic studies 
assess explicit and unequivocal probability understanding. In fact, whereas I have 
referred to these studies as the “contemporary” approach, Reyna and Brainerd (1994) 
label them as “the intuitive approach” and the Schlottmann (2001) paper is entitled, 
“Children’s Probability Intuitions.” Whereas Piaget and colleagues asked, “can the 
young child demonstrate an understanding of probability?” the contemporary 
theorists are asking, “can the young child use probabilistically structured information 
to guide intuitions?”  
This difference in experimental investigation may actually soften the arguments 
the contemporary studies make against the classic studies, simply because those that 
used a classic approach acknowledged the young child’s intuitive abilities:  
“Observing things superficially, we could have the impression that the young 
child, and even the baby, dissociate the possible from the necessary. When the 
nursing child hears a noise behind the door and expects, without being sure of 
it, to see his mother appear, we could say, in fact, that he considers this 
appearance as possible and not as certain, or even as probable to some degree. 
Such an interpretation would lead us to conceive of the judgment of 
probability as very primitive and even anterior to precise ideas about chance, 
or as related to intuitive notions of the uncertain or the unexpected” (Piaget 
and Inhelder, 1951/1975, p. 216-7).  
Piaget and Inhelder move on to dismiss these “superficial” and “implicit” abilities as 
falsely indicative of probability “understanding,” on the bases that young children 
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also demonstrate pronounced inabilities. Contemporary theorists, on the other hand, 
propose that similar intuitive abilities are indicative of competence, and that Piaget 
failed to notice them with difficult tasks. If the notion of all-or-none competence is 
thrown out, or if a universal definition of competence is applied, however, the 
traditional and modern theories of probability understanding become 
indistinguishable. This is not to say that the contemporary methods and results do not 
differ from the traditional; rather, the methodological and empirical differences may 
originate from theoretically different definitions of probability understanding.  
The methodology discussed below was designed in part to disentangle this 
argument. Rather than consider whether or not younger children are less competent 
than older children, the studies will attempt to determine, more intensively, the 
abilities and competencies of children of different ages. It is predicted, consistent with 
the contemporary approach, that intuitive probability understanding will emerge at a 
relatively young age; however, it is also predicted, consistent with the traditional 
approach, that explicit demonstration of probability understanding, as determined 
with a forced-choice measure, will emerge at a slightly later age.  
The Child’s Appreciation of Risk and Uncertainty 
A number of experimental studies have attempted to plot the emergence of the 
child’s understanding of risk and uncertainty. Risk-taking is a special condition of 
decision-making; specifically, risks are defined in the developmental literature as 
decisions in which one or more of the available alternatives have the potential to 
produce an undesirable outcome. Here, the specific probabilities are known. 
Uncertainty, in contrast, is the accepted term in the decision field for decision-making 
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situations in which the associated alternative outcome probabilities are not available 
(Lopes, 1994; Tversky & Fox, 1995; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). As with decision-
making in the general sense, situations of risk and uncertainly are intrinsically related 
to probabilities and outcome values, and as such, the current discussion of the child’s 
understanding of risk and uncertainty, and the above discussions of the child’s 
understanding of outcome values and probabilities, are intrinsically related (although 
such relations have been very implicit thus far in the developmental literature). 
Furthermore, it is argued that the methods used to experimentally investigate the 
child’s understanding of outcome values and probabilities might be manipulated to 
investigate the child’s understanding of risk and uncertainty (or vice versa).  
In perhaps the first study of risk-taking involving children, Slovic (1966) 
presented children, between the ages of six- and 16-years, with a series of choices, 
each of which resulted in either gain of a desirable prize or loss of all prizes. Slovic 
(1966) presented the participant with a row of 10 switches, nine of which were “safe,” 
one of which was a risky “disaster” switch (initial .9 probability of gain, and .1 
probability of loss). Participants were told that they could flip as many of the switches 
as they like, and for each safe switch they flipped they would receive a desirable 
prize; however, if they flipped the disaster switch they would lose all the prizes they 
had accumulated. Probabilistically, the most adaptive strategy in this task is to flip 
five of the switches (i.e., expected value = 2.5). Although very few participants 
elected to cease flipping switches prior to this point of maximum expected value, 
most participants did elect to stop and collect their prize after reaching this point, 
which suggests relative appreciation of the risk involved. Furthermore, although age 
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was not analyzed as an independent variable, the results suggested an age X gender 
interaction; that is, boys, and particularly older boys, tended to be more risk-seeking 
(i.e., they tended to flip more switches than older girls).  
One very recent study, Hoffrage, Hertwig, Weber, and Chase (2003), used this 
classic methodology, and found that five- and six-year-olds classified as risk-takers 
on the task (i.e., those that flipped a high number of switches) were far more likely to 
engage in actual risky behaviors than were those classified as risk-avoidant (i.e., risk-
takers were more likely to attempt to cross a street when doing so was not safe). 
Another experimental task, Lejuez and colleagues’ Balloon Analogue Risk Task 
(BART; Lejuez et al. 2002; 2003a; 2003b), makes use of a very similar structure (i.e., 
participants must choose whether or not to proceed through a series of events, with 
some probability of disaster). Recent studies conducted with the BART have revealed 
correlations between task performance and prototypical real-world risk behaviors 
(e.g., smoking cigarettes, drinking alcohol, and fighting). Hoffrage et al. (2003) and 
Lejuez et al. (2002; 2003a; 2003b) thus provide a degree of validation for the 
structure of Slovic’s classic methodology with contemporary populations, and 
furthermore, suggest individual differences in risk appraisal.  
Byrnes and colleagues’ have also developed a decision-making task, referred to as 
“the decision game,” which has introduced several interesting findings (Byrnes & 
McClenney, 1994; Byrnes, Miller, & Reynolds, 1999). In the decision game, 
participants are presented with a simple game board (similar to a traditional board 
game, as that used in Monopoly or Trivia Pursuit) that has a base area, an 
intermediate card area, a goal area, and three paths connecting each. At the 
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intermediate area participants are required to flip a card, revealing either a trivia 
question or a “go back to base” command. The probability of success on each path 
varied through manipulation of question difficulty and rate of the “go back to base” 
command (i.e., one path had relatively more easy questions, making it relatively risk 
free, another more difficult questions, giving it moderate risk, and the third more “go 
back to base” commands, making it very risky). Therefore, the real decision on this 
task is which path to choose in pursuit of the goal area. Byrnes and McClenney 
(1994) found that adolescents and adults use similar strategies in evaluating the path 
options; however, adults made consistently better choices and were actually more 
optimistic in their abilities to succeed through risk (i.e., adults assumed greater 
confidence at reaching the goal area by answering difficult questions). Miller, Byrnes, 
and Reynolds (1999) extended this and incorporated feedback into the game by 
giving the participants more information about the questions that would be asked (in 
effect, making them less uncertain). Results showed that adult participants benefited 
from feedback more so than adolescents.  
The “Iowa Gambling Task,” which has quite recently been applied to children 
and adolescents, is another experimental methodology that has become somewhat 
popular for assessing understanding of risk and uncertainty (Bechara, Damasio, & 
Damasio, 2000; Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, & Lee, 1999; Bechara, Damasio, 
Damasio, & Tranel, 1994; Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1997; Damasio, 
1994). Damasio and colleagues assume an affective decision-making perspective, and 
in effect argue that individuals do not necessarily need to explicitly understand the 
underlying probabilities of decision-makings situation to make rational decisions. 
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This somatic marker hypothesis posits that in cases of risk and uncertainty, emotional, 
rather than cognitive, acknowledgement of positive and negative consequences 
influences decision-making (Bechara et al. 2000; 1999; 1994; 1997; Damasio, 1994).  
“In short, somatic markers are a special instance of feelings generated from 
secondary emotions. Those emotions and feelings have been connected, by 
learning, to predicted future outcomes of certain scenarios. When a negative 
somatic marker is juxtaposed to a particular future outcome the combination 
functions as an alarm bell. When a positive somatic marker is juxtaposed instead, 
it becomes a beacon of incentive” (Damasio, 1994, p. 174).  
This argument is quite congruent with the above argument that intuitive use of 
probability is sufficient for competence, and perhaps the timing and popularity of the 
two approaches is related.  
Returning to the experimental design of the Iowa gambling task, participants are 
asked to draw cards from one of four decks, each of which has an unspecified 
schedule of gains and losses. The decks are manipulated so that two of the decks are 
comparatively risky (i.e., although they have generally larger payoffs, they lead to 
larger losses, ultimately resulting in net losses), and two of the decks are 
comparatively safe (i.e., they generally have smaller payoffs, but lead to smaller 
losses, ultimately resulting in net gains). Initially, participants show a preference for 
the risky decks; however, after about 30 trials healthy adults tend to gravitate towards 
the safer decks (Bechara et al., 1994; 1999; 2000b).  
The gambling task has recently been adapted in attempts to assess the 
development of affective decision-making capacities. Each developmental adaptation 
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of the task has involved several alterations to ensure comprehension by the younger 
samples, three of which are common across studies: 1) the prizes are items rather than 
monetary (e.g., children win candy), 2) wins and losses are represented by illustrated 
images (e.g., happy faces, bears, or apples represent wins, sad faces or tigers 
represent losses, rather than simple positive and negative numeric values), and 3) the 
prize values are relatively small (e.g., wins are one or two candies, losses are of 
similarly low value, rather than hundreds of dollars). Other manipulations have been 
less universal, and will be addressed individually. 
Kerr and Zelazo (2004) adopted a version of the gambling task, which was 
administered to three- and four-year-olds. For simplification purposes, two decks of 
cards (rather than four), and decreased prize values were used (i.e., the advantageous 
deck always had a win of one, and a loss of zero or one prizes, the disadvantageous 
deck always had a win of two, and losses of zero, four, five, or six prizes). These 
preselected values may be problematic, because they potentially confound the design; 
specifically, the disadvantageous deck’s outcomes are more complex. This issue 
aside, Kerr and Zelazo (2004) revealed an age x trial block interaction; four-year-olds 
were more likely than three-year-olds to gravitate towards the advantageous deck in 
the latter trials of the task. Further analyses also revealed that four-year-olds selected 
from the advantageous deck at a rate significantly greater than chance, but three-year-
olds selected from the disadvantageous deck at a rate significantly greater than 
chance. Although presented cautiously, there was also a gender difference; 
specifically, males were more likely to choose advantageously than females.  
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In another very recent study, Garon and Moore (2004) presented three-, four-, and 
six-year-olds with a fairly standard version of the Iowa gambling task. Children were 
shown four decks of cards (two of which were advantageous, two of which were 
disadvantageous), and were asked to draw cards from the decks to win and lose candy 
prizes. Unlike Kerr and Zelazo (2004), Garon and Moore (2004) found no main effect 
for trial block (i.e., no difference in deck preference between the first and second 
halves of the task), and no evidence of increased preference for the advantageous 
decks with age. The results, however, did reveal that six year-olds were more 
conceptually aware of the game structure than three- and four-year-olds. Finally, 
Garon and Moore (2004) found a gender X trial block interaction; however, again in 
contrast to Kerr and Zelazo (2004), females tended to choose from the advantageous 
decks more than males. 
Crone and colleagues have administered another adaptation of the gambling task 
to slightly older children (six-year-olds through nine-year-olds), adolescents (12-13-
year-olds and 15-16-year-olds), and young adults (Crone & van der Molen, 2004; 
Crone, Vendel, & van der Molen, 2003). This computerized version of the gambling 
task, which is referred to as “the hungry donkey task,” presents the participant with 
four doors (instead of drawing cards from decks) and a hungry donkey character. The 
objective of the task is to open the doors so that the hungry donkey might get to 
apples that are on the other side. The task is otherwise structurally analogous to the 
original gambling task. The findings, across three studies, suggest development of 
decision-making abilities between childhood, adolescence, and young adulthood; that 
is, six-year-olds through twelve-year-olds did not gravitate towards advantageous 
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doors as soon or as consistently as teenagers, who did not gravitate towards 
advantageous doors as soon or as consistently as adults (Crone & van der Molen, 
2004; Crone et al. 2003). Also, older participants were more likely to gain explicit 
conceptual understanding of the task, and regarding individual differences, those 
identified as disinhibited were less likely to select advantageously.  
In one final study, Ernst et al. (2003) administered a standard gambling task to 
adolescent and adult participants who had been classified as healthy or as having 
previously exhibited behavioral disorders. The general results were that healthy 
adolescents and adults did not significantly differ in task performance; however, 
adolescents with behavioral disorders demonstrated less improvement in task 
performance between administrations conducted a week apart than healthy 
participants. This, along with Crone and colleagues work, suggests an individual 
difference component to understanding risk and uncertainty. 
Each of these experimental studies (the classic Slovic task, Byrnes and 
colleagues’ decision-making game, and the Iowa gambling task) has informed what 
we know of children’s decision-making tendencies in risky and uncertain situations. It 
is currently argued, however, that there is still much to be investigated, and what 
actually develops absolutely has not been determined! Byrnes and colleagues appeal 
to cognitive self-regulatory capacities that improve with the transition from 
adolescence to young adulthood (Byrnes, 1998; Byrnes & McClenney, 1994; Byrnes 
et al. 1999). Crone and van der Molen (2004) mention probability understanding as a 
potential cognitive mechanism of development, and further, empirically discount 
working memory capacity and inductive reasoning skills as sources of developmental 
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change in risk-taking tendencies. Likewise, Garon and Moore (2004) mention the 
potential importance of win and loss frequency. Perhaps more intense manipulation of 
these types of tasks, with greater control over task variables, would lead to more 
precise understanding of the cognitive developments that underlie the child’s 
appreciation of risk and uncertainty.  
It is also argued that each of these uncertainty and risk-taking studies is quite 
conceptually and structurally similar to the above reviewed studies of child 
probability understanding. For instance, both the Iowa gambling task and Byrnes and 
colleagues’ decision game use an experimental design and response mechanism that 
is quite similar to that of the traditional approach to probability understanding (i.e., 
both ask “what is your decision given the current situation?”). Similar to the 
contemporary studies of probability understanding, however, both the gambling task 
and decision game allow extremely rich analysis by using a sequence of choices as a 
metric for intuitive preference. This similarity might be made more explicit, and 
studies of the child’s understanding of probability and studies of the child’s 
understanding of risk and uncertainty might inform one another. Furthermore, these 
issues might be investigated with a common methodology. A methodology that 
attempts to accomplish just this is discussed below. 
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Chapter 2: The Current Studies 
The current studies were designed to address the following questions:  
(1) How sensitive are children to quantitative variations in outcome values 
in decision situations? 
(2) How sensitive are children to probability of success in decision 
situations?   
(3) How sensitive are children to loss, and can children differentiate more 
risky options from less risky options, in decision situations?  
Although other researchers have asked these questions before, I have argued that 
methodological improvements might be made, and that these questions might be 
investigated more intensively.  In addition, the literatures concerning each question 
have remained largely distinct; however, a common methodology might be adapted, 
which can extend and integrate the independent lines of research. In the current task 
participants were presented with a stream of choices between alternatives. This 
experimental procedure has several advantages over alternatives. First, the stimuli can 
be controlled (i.e., the probabilities of success and quantitative win and loss values 
can be manipulated), to address the roles of probability, outcome value, and risk in 
decision situations. Second, the various stimuli and contrasts that might be introduced 
will produce a rich data set, which should shed new light on the child’s cognitive 
abilities. Finally, this format approximates probability as it is experienced in actual 
decision-making situations. As reviewed, studies of probability understanding tend to 
present the participant with a perceptually visible and static probabilistic structure 
(e.g., view this spinner, tube, or array of counters). Actual decisions, however, are 
  
            31
composed of underlying, imperceptible, and time-variant probability structures, 
which the current task taps into.  
The Expected Value Model  
The design of the current task was governed by formally expressed probability 
and value structures. Decisions, at their most basic level, are composed of potential 
positive and negative values, and the probabilities that either the positive or negative 
values will be realized if an alternative is decided upon. In this sense, expected value 
can be a powerful research tool, particularly when investigating the development of 
the most basic processes. The classic normative expected value (EV) model states 
that the value of a decision alternative is the sum of the products of the probability (P) 
and value (V) of the potential outcomes associated with the alternative: 
i
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The foci of Studies 1 and 2 are the child’s sensitivity to outcome value and the child’s 
sensitivity to probability. In these studies task options involve two outcomes - one 
positive outcome, and one zero value outcome. Thus, for Studies 1 and 2, where V > 0 
and P is the probability of winning V points, we can write equation (1) as 
EV = PV  (2) 
Study 3, however, was designed to address appreciation of risk. Risk taking, by 
definition, involves both wins and losses. Therefore, a slightly more useful way of 
stating this task model, in which one outcome is positive and one is negative, 
represents both the potential gain and losses associated with the option:  
EV = PV1 + (1-P) V2  (3) 
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Where V1 > 0, V2 < 0, and P is the probability of winning V1. In this sense, an option 
might be considered risky when EV < 0 (i.e., when losses are more frequent or of 
higher quantitative value than gains). Furthermore, the gain V1 and the loss V2 were 
set equal to the same value, thus V1 = -V2. Using V instead of V1, substituting into 
Equation (3) and rearranging terms yields: 
EV = V (2P – 1)  (4) 
The PLUG Apparatus 
Each of the current studies was conducted with a simple computerized task 
designed explicitly to analyze the development of sensitivity to quantitative outcome 
values, probabilities, and risk. Participants were asked to choose between two buttons 
on the computer screen, each of which was associated with a panel that did, or did 
not, light-up as a consequence of each button push. Whereas each button push that 
resulted in a lighted panel resulted in points gained, when the button failed to light the 
panel the child either gained no points (i.e., Study 1 and Study 2), or lost points (i.e., 
Study 3). The probability of success and the number of points associated with each 
button were manipulated, and the child’s reactions to outcome values, probabilities, 
and losses could be analyzed over a considerable number of trials, within a standard 
methodology, hereafter referred to as the Probabilistic Light-Up Game (PLUG).  
General Procedure 
Each of the three studies followed the same format. After the participant’s age and 
gender were gathered, the participant was read an assent script and was asked to 
verify that he/she wanted to participate. Basically, participants were told in child 
friendly terms that the game had been approved by an university Institutional Review 
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Board, that they could cease participation at any point in the task, and that they had 
the right to refuse to participate (See Appendix 1A for the entire assent script). Once 
the child agreed to participate, task instructions appeared and were read to the 
participant. Participants were told that they would get to push buttons to win and lose 
points, that when a button push resulted in a lighted bulb they would win points, 
when a button push resulted in an unlit bulb they would not win points (Studies 1 and 
2) or would lose points (Study 3), and finally that they should try to win as many 
points as possible (See Appendix 1B for the entire instructions script). After receiving 
these instructions, participants were asked two multiple choice questions which were 
designed to verify that they understood the task. The first of these asked, “How do 
you play the light up game?” The response options were, “You move shapes,” “You 
push buttons,” or “You bounce balls.” Once the participant gave the correct reply 
(“You push buttons”), the second question appeared, which was, “What happens if 
you press a button and its light lights-up?” The available options were “You lose 
tokens,” “Nothing,” and “You win points.” Once the participant gave the correct 
response (“You win points”), a button labeled “Next” appeared. If the participant 
indicated that he/she did not understand the initial instructions, or if he/she responded 
incorrectly to either of the multiple-choice questions, he/she was taken to an alternate 
instructions screen, and the issue of confusion was readdressed more explicitly. Upon 
pressing the “Next” button, however, the participant proceeded to a session 
instructions screen, which stated that he/she would have the opportunity to try each 
button before beginning the choice aspect of the game, and that he/she would begin 
the task with 0 points. 
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Once the participant pressed a “Play the Game” button, he/she was taken to the 
options exposure phase. During this phase, the child saw a single button on the screen 
an inch either right or left of the center of the screen, and had ten trials of testing the 
lone option. On a probabilistically controlled percentage of these trials the button 
push resulted in a lighted panel, a window presenting a happy face, and the number of 
points won (e.g., V points, with probability P). If the button push did not light the 
panel, a window presented a sad face, and instead of winning the participant was 
informed that either no points had been won (e.g., Study 1 and Study 2, V = 0), or 
points had been lost (e.g., Study 3, V points, with probability 1 - P). After ten 
exposure trials the first option disappeared, and the child was presented with a second 
button that was a different color than the first and appeared an inch from the center on 
the opposite side of the screen (whether the first button appeared right or left of the 
center of the screen was randomly selected by the program). After ten exposure trials 
with only the second option the child entered the experimental choice phase. In this 
phase the participant was shown both buttons simultaneously and was asked to make 
a series of 20 choices between the two (See Figure 1). As was the case in the 
exposure trials, the corresponding panels lit, and points were won, as governed by the 
probabilistic and outcome value control program inherent to each button. Across 
studies, the parameters for each button, and the contrasts between the buttons were 
strategically selected to assess the child’s preference for higher value, more probable, 
and less risky options.   
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Figure 1. Visual representation of the PLUG task. 
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A final step was taken immediately after each series of 40-trials, which tested 
explicit understanding through forced choice. Participants were presented with a 
picture of Kermit the frog, they were told to imagine that Kermit also enjoys playing 
the game, and were asked which of the buttons that the they had experienced Kermit 
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would prefer. Because this forced choice measure demands more explicit processing 
of the decision alternatives, and because children are believed to be capable of 
making intuitively guided choices before they explicitly realize the bases for their 
decisions, it was predicted that younger participants would be more likely to respond 
to the forced-choice question randomly (i.e., 50:50). Younger children, however, 
might not differ significantly from the older participants in intuitively guided 
preference across trials (i.e., button selection throughout the task).  
After each child completed a series of exposure trials, choice trials, and the 
Kermit preference measure for a given contrast, he/she was told the current point 
total, and upon repressing the “Play the Game Button” a new set of 40 trials ensued 
marked by a modification of the appearance of the game (i.e., the buttons’ and 
background colors changed). All participants completed several sessions of the task in 
this manner, each of which involved contrasts drawn between new options with 
different probabilistic or outcome value structures (See Figure 2). It should also be 
noted that across studies a unique subset of contrasts were drawn against a centralized 
standard (i.e., in each study, across sessions, contrasts were drawn between four 
alternatives and a standard option that had P = .5, V = 5 points). Finally, for 
simplicity, the experiments incorporated whole number point values, and all point 
transactions throughout the task were recorded for the child to see in a point meter 
that appeared on the left side of the computer screen (as can also be seen in Figure 1). 
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Figure 2. Flowchart diagram of the steps of the PLUG experiment.  
Experimental Choice Phase.  
20 Choice Trials. 
Exposure Phase #2.  
10 Trials with option 2.
Exposure Phase #1.  
10 Trials with option 1.
Participant told point total 
(initially 0 points). 
Participant 
answers questions 
to verify task 
understanding.
Experimenter reads task  
instructions to participant.
Experimenter reads assent 
script to participant.
Participant characteristics 
are recorded in the 
program. 
If Session = 6 
Game over screen.  
Total points displayed.
If < Session 6. 
Kermit Preference Measure.  
If Correct 
If Incorrect 
Alternate Instructions.
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Chapter 3: Study 1 – The Child’s Sensitivity to Quantitative Outcome Value 
The few studies that have investigated the issue have generally found that 
relatively young children show appreciation of the benefits of higher over lower 
outcome values. Contemporary research has also revealed that children can attend to 
basic quantitative differences from a relatively young age (i.e., by 3-4 years). This, 
compounded with the fact that the outcome value associated with a give option is 
immediately perceptually available in the current task (i.e., participants are shown 
“You Won V Points!” every time they experience a win), led to the prediction that 
even the youngest participants in the current study will demonstrate sensitivity to 
outcome value. This study, however, was designed to more precisely assess how 
sensitive children are to quantitative outcome value.  
Methods 
Participants 
The Institutional Review Board at the University of Maryland approved the 
current methodology for child participation (IRB/HSR Protocol Identification 
Number: 04-0498). Participants were 89 kindergartners, first-, second-, third-, and 
fourth-graders who were recruited from a kindergarten affiliated with the University 
of Maryland at College Park and suburban Maryland private elementary schools. 
(Mage = 7-years-10-months, SDage = 1-year-6-months; 47 female, 42 male). For 
analytic purposes the participants were categorized into three age groups (32, 5-6-
year-olds; 32, 7-8-year-olds; 25, 9-10-year-olds; See Table 1).  
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_____________________________________________________________________ 
Table 1 
 
Number of participants per age and gender category. 
 
Gender 5-6 Years 7-8 Years 9-10 Years Total 
Female 14 17 16 47 
Male 18 15 9 42 
Total 32 32 25 N = 89 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Materials 
The intent of the current study is to examine the development of sensitivity to 
differences in quantitative outcome values between options in a basic decision-
making situation; therefore, a unique subset of options and contrasts were selected. 
Each participant was asked to choose between two options (i.e., they were presented 
with two computerized buttons at a time) in each of six consecutive trial block 
sessions. Each trial block session involved 40 trials [i.e., 10 exposure trials to Option 
#1 + 10 exposure trials to Option #2 + 20 choice trials between Option #1 and Option 
#2). Thus, each participant experienced a total of 240 trials. Through the course of 
these six trial block sessions, participants were presented with five options that 
differed in value of success, but were constant in probability of success (P = 0.5): 
V1 = 3, V2 = 4, V3 = 5, V4 = 6, V5 = 7 
These five options were incorporated into six different contrasts, two each at three 
levels of outcome value disparity (Vx - Vy = 1, 2, or 3; See Table 2 for a summary of 
the values associated with each option, and the explicit contrasts that were drawn). 
For instance, in experimental contrast #5, with one option the participant won three  
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_____________________________________________________________________ 
Table 2 
 
Contrasts selected to assess the child’s sensitivity to options with different 
value, holding probability of success constant, EV = PV. 
 
Contrast* Vx, Vy Px, Py Vx - Vy Px - Py EVx - EVy 
1b 4 vs. 5 0.5 vs. 0.5 1 0.0 .5 
2 b 5 vs. 6 0.5 vs. 0.5 1 0.0 .5 
3 b 3 vs. 5 0.5 vs. 0.5 2 0.0 1.0 
4 b 5 vs. 7 0.5 vs. 0.5 2 0.0 1.0 
5 3 vs. 6 0.5 vs. 0.5 3 0.0 1.5 
6 4 vs. 7 0.5 vs. 0.5 3 0.0 1.5 
 
*Note: The presentation of the contrasts followed a fixed random schedule, in 
the following order: Contrast 5, 1, 4, 6, 2, 3. 
b Note: Contrast makes explicit use of a standard reference (V = 5, P = .5). 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
points on an average of half the trials, (and won no points on the remaining trials). 
With the other option the participant won six points on an average on half the trials 
(and won no points on the other half), thus producing a contrast disparity of three 
points (i.e., V1 - V2 = 3 points).  
Procedure 
Data collection took place during regular school or during after-school hours in 
familiar rooms adjacent to the participants’ classrooms, in each of six data collection 
sites. Each participant was instructed and engaged the “Probabilistic Light-Up Game” 
as described above.  
Results 
Preliminary Analyses  A series of preliminary analyses were conducted to 
assess the effects of potential confounding variables. These analyses revealed that 
option selection did not vary by data collection location (i.e., which of the six sites the 
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data were collected at), by randomly assigned option characteristics (i.e., the color 
randomly assigned to each button by the computer program, and whether the first 
option appeared right or left of the computer screen center), and the total amount of 
time that children took to complete the experiment (Mtime  = 8-minutes, 10-seconds, 
SDtime = 3-minutes, 3 seconds). All subsequent analyses, therefore, were collapsed 
across these variables.  
Experimental Choice Phase Analysis  The experimental choice phase analyses 
considered participant rates of selection of the superior option in the experimental 
choice trials. Collapsing across age and gender groups and disparity conditions, 
participants selected the superior option (i.e., that with a superior outcome value) on 
just slightly over half of the total sessions (M = .518, SD = .203; See Table 3). The 
primary comparative analysis consisted of a 3 age group (5-6 years, 7-8 years, 9-10 
years) X 2 gender X 2 trial block (first or second block of ten experimental choice 
trials) X 3 contrast disparity condition (V1 - V2 = 1, 2, 3) mixed model Analysis of 
Variance (ANOVA), with age and gender analyzed between-subjects, and contrast 
disparity condition and trial block analyzed within-subjects. The dependent measure 
in this analysis was the number of times each participant chose the option with the 
superior outcome value, per ten trials, per disparity condition. This analysis revealed 
a significant main effect for age group, F(2, 83) = 3.45, p = .036, 1-β = .632. 
Bonferroni controlled post hoc analyses indicated that the difference between the 
youngest (5- and 6-year-olds) and the middle (7- and 8-year-olds) age groups 
approached significance, t (62) = 2.19, p = .060. The ANOVA also revealed a  
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_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Table 3 
 
Means and standard deviations of the proportion of trials participants 
selected the superior option in the experimental choice phase, per age group, 
gender, trial block, and disparity condition. 
 
Age Group  
     5-6-year-olds .489 (.225)
     7-8-year-olds .540 (.183)
     9-10-year-olds .528 (.194)
Gender  
     Female  .502 (.188)
     Male .536 (.218)
Trial Block  
     Trial Block 1 .513 (.188)
     Trial Block 2 .522 (.217)
Disparity Condition  
     Disparity Condition1 .494 (.204)
     Disparity Condition2 .524 (.210)
     Disparity Condition3 .535 (.193)
Overall .518 (.203)
 
Note: N = 89 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
significant main effect for gender, F(1, 83) = 3.99, p = .049, 1-β = .506, with males 
selecting the superior option more frequently than females. The main effects for trial 
block and disparity condition were not significant. 
Individual Selection Analyses  Individual selection analyses were conducted in 
order to assess whether the performance of a few participants may be biasing the 
sample. The binomial theorem was used to determine whether each individual 
participant’s selections throughout the entire task significantly differed from random 
response. It was determined that selecting either option (i.e., the superior or inferior 
button) on 72 of the total 120-trials was the significant difference criterion (assuming 
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α < .05). This analysis revealed that the vast majority of participants did not select 
either the superior or inferior option more frequently than expected by chance. In fact, 
only 10 participants (11%) selected the superior option more frequently than expected 
by chance, and only four participants (4%) selected the inferior option more 
frequently than expected by chance. This finding suggests that participants tended to 
use a split judgment strategy, selecting either option with near equal frequency.  
Forced-Choice Analysis The final series of analyses considered participant 
selection on the explicit forced-choice measure (i.e., whether or not the participant 
accurately predicted Kermit would prefer the superior option). Collapsing across age 
and gender groups and disparity conditions, participants responded that Kermit would 
prefer the superior option (i.e., the option with a superior outcome value) on just over 
half of the total sessions (M = .562, SD = .497; See Table 4).  
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Table 4 
 
Mean proportion of accurate prediction on the forced-choice Kermit 
preference measure, per age group, gender, and disparity condition. 
 
Age Group  
     5-6-year-olds .505
     7-8-year-olds .568
     9-10-year-olds .627
Gender  
     Female .567
     Male .556
Disparity Condition  
     Disparity Condition1 .551
     Disparity Condition2 .562
     Disparity Condition3 .573
Overall .562
 
Note: N = 89 
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Responses on the forced-choice measure were significantly, but only moderately, 
correlated with selection of the superior option in the experimental choice phase 
sessions, R (534) = .213, p < .001. A 3 age group (5-6 years, 7-8 years, 9-10 years) X 
2 gender X 3 contrast disparity condition (V1 - V2 = 1, 2, 3) mixed model ANOVA, 
with age and gender analyzed between-subjects, and contrast disparity condition 
analyzed within-subjects, was conducted. The dependent measure in this analysis was 
the number of times participants accurately predicted that Kermit would prefer the 
superior option. Although accuracy in predicting that Kermit would prefer the 
superior option did increase with age (See Figure 3), the analysis revealed that this 
main effect was non-significant, F(2, 83) = 2.07, p = .132, 1-β = .416, as were all 
other main effects and interactions. 
 
 
Figure 3. Accuracy in the forced-choice measure per age group. 
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Discussion 
The above results were unexpected. Whereas previous studies have demonstrated 
that relatively young children are able to use quantitative outcome values to guide 
preferences (Schlottmann, 2000; 2001; Schlottmann & Anderson, 1994), the obtained 
results revealed significant age differences in sensitivity to outcome value, and across 
dependent measures, the youngest participants selected the superior option on no 
more than half of the trials. Group differences aside, the individual performance 
results suggest that most participants, independent of age, had a tendency to employ a 
split-judgment strategy in the current task (i.e., they picked neither option more 
frequently than expected by chance). This is demonstrative of relative insensitivity to 
quantitative outcome values.  
It appears that participants may have been using probability information, rather 
than outcome value information, to guide their selections. Recall, the probability of 
success for each alternative was controlled (i.e., P = .5 for both alternatives in each of 
the 40-trial sessions). Since each alternative in every decision pair had equal 
probability for success, if participants were using probability to guide their selections, 
the result would be near equal selection of each alternative. This was precisely what 
was found, despite the differences between each of the alternatives’ quantitative 
outcome values. Essentially, participants, and particularly the younger participants, 
seem to have adopted a strategy of seeking wins instead of losses, independent of the 
quantitative point value associated with winning. Perhaps had the constancy of 
probability across alternatives been made more apparent, maybe participants would 
have demonstrated greater reliance upon outcome values. Implementing a condition 
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in which probability is constant across the two options in a decision pair, but variable 
across sessions may be one way to do this, which is one direction future studies may 
go. Another manipulation that might shed some light on this issue would be to control 
the outcome value associated with each option and draw contrasts between options 
with varying probabilities of success. This was precisely what was done in Study 2. 
One potential alternative explanation for the obtained results is that, despite being 
readily perceptually available, the presentation of quantitative outcome value was 
dependent upon conventional numerical representation (i.e., on every win trial the 
participant was shown, “You won V points,” with outcome value represented as V = 
“3,” “4,” “5,” “6,” or “7”). In designing the study it was assumed that even the 
youngest participants (i.e., five-year-olds) would be familiar with the graphical 
presentation of each numeral (i.e., that they could identify “3” as “three,” and 
comprehend that “3” is less than “4,” etc.). No participants, in any of the age groups 
demonstrated any confusion whatsoever to this presentation strategy; however, it is 
possible that the results may have been slightly different had the outcome values 
associated with each alternative been presented differently. For instance, one 
alternative strategy would be to present each point won discretely (i.e., as “O, O, O” 
instead of “3”). Another alternative would be to present the points in a more tangible 
fashion (i.e., physically present the participant with V tokens per win). Either of these 
manipulations might make the quantitative outcome value associated with each 
alternative more salient, perhaps especially so for the younger participants, and 
should be taken into consideration in future studies.  
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Another related possibility is that the quantitative outcome values contrasted in 
the current experiment were not sufficiently disparate to motivate consistent selection 
of the superior alternative. The current study revealed only slight evidence that 
selection is related to outcome value disparity; however, perhaps participants would 
have been more attentive to quantitative outcome value and would have selected the 
superior option more frequently, had there been greater discrepancy between the 
contrasted pairs (e.g., had disparity been 3, 6, and 9 points, rather than 1, 2, and 3 
points). This too is an issue that future work should consider.  
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Chapter 4: Study 2 – The Child’s Sensitivity to Probability 
The current study was designed to assess the child’s sensitivity to probability in a 
decision-making situation. The findings of Study 1 suggested that children may attend 
to probability of success and neglect quantitative outcome values. In addition, recent 
research has found that children are able to use probability information to guide 
preferences. It was therefore predicted that even young children would be sensitive to 
probabilistic differences in outcomes, and would select the more probable alternative 
significantly more often than the less probable alternative. This, however, is the 
primary empirical question the current study was explicitly designed to answer. 
Another issue of central importance is whether or not there would be a difference 
between intuitively guided selection of options in the choice phases of the task and 
more explicit preference, as assessed by the forced-choice dependent measure (i.e., 
Kermit preference). Although even the youngest children in the current sample might 
intuitively select the more probable option more frequently than the less probable 
option, it was also predicted that there would be age differences in explicit preference 
(i.e., older children would be more accurate than younger children in surmising that a 
character would prefer the probabilistically superior option). 
Methods 
Participants 
The Institutional Review Board at the University of Maryland approved the 
current methodology for child participation (IRB/HSR Protocol Identification 
Number: 04-0498). Participants were 80 kindergartners, first-, second-, third-, and 
fourth-graders who were recruited from a kindergarten affiliated with the University 
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of Maryland at College Park and suburban Maryland private elementary schools (Mage 
= 7-years-10-months, SDage = 1-year-7-months; 43 female, 37 male). For analytic 
purposes the participants were categorized into three age groups (28, 5-6-year-olds; 
29, 7-8-year-olds; 23, 9-10-year-olds; See Table 5). All participants had parental 
permission and assented to participate. 
Materials 
Each participant was asked to choose between two options (i.e., they were 
presented with two computerized buttons at a time) in each of six consecutive trial 
block sessions of 40 trials, for a grand total of 240 trials [i.e., (10 exposure trials to 
Option 1 + 10 exposure trials to Option 2 + 20 choice trials between Option 1 and 
Option 2) X 6 experimental sessions = 240 total trials]. The choices were drawn from 
a set of five options that differed in probability of success, but were constant in value 
of success (V = 5 points): 
P1 = .3, P2 = .4, P3 = .5, P4 = .6, P5 = .7 
Each trial block session included a different contrast, and the six contrasts 
represented two examples each of three levels of disparity in outcome probability (Px 
- Py = .1, .2, or .3; See Table 6). 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Table 5 
 
Number of participants per age and gender category. 
 
Gender 5-6 Years 7-8 Years 9-10 Years Total 
Female 12 18 13 43 
Male 16 11 10 37 
Total 28 29 23 N = 80 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
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_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Table 6 
 
Contrasts selected to assess the child’s sensitivity to options with different 
probabilities of success, holding outcome value constant, EV = PV. 
 
Contrast* Vx, Vy Px, Py Vx - Vy Px - Py EVx - EVy  
1b 5 vs. 5 0.4 vs. 0.5 0 0.1 .5 
2 b 5 vs. 5 0.5 vs. 0.6 0 0.1 .5 
3 b 5 vs. 5 0.3 vs. 0.5 0 0.2 1.0 
4 b 5 vs. 5 0.5 vs. 0.7 0 0.2 1.0 
5 5 vs. 5 0.3 vs. 0.6 0 0.3 1.5 
6 5 vs. 5 0.4 vs. 0.7 0 0.3 1.5 
 
*Note: The presentation of the contrasts followed a fixed random schedule, in 
the following order: Contrast 5, 1, 4, 6, 2, 3. 
b Note: Contrast makes explicit use of a standard reference (V = 5, Pw = .5). 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
For instance, in contrast #3, choice of one button yielded five points on an average of 
3/10 of the trials (and no points in the other 7/10 of the trials) while the other button 
yielded five points on an average of 5/10 trials (and no points on the remaining 5/10 
trials). Thus, the probabilities of winning differed by .2 (i.e., P1 - P2 = .2).  
Procedure  
Data collection took place during regular school or during after-school hours in 
familiar rooms adjacent to the participants’ classrooms, in each of five data collection 
locations. The experimental protocol described above was used in this experiment.  
Results 
The same series of analyses that were conducted in Study 1 were used in the 
current study (i.e., preliminary analyses, experimental choice phase analyses, 
individual selection analyses, and forced-choice analyses). Again, preliminary 
analyses revealed that option selection did not vary by data collection location (i.e., 
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where the data were collected), by randomly assigned option characteristics (i.e., the 
color randomly assigned to each button by the computer program, and whether the 
first option appeared right or left of the center of the computer screen), and the total 
amount of time that children took to complete the experiment (Mtime  = 8-minutes, 39-
seconds, SDtime = 4-minutes, 5 seconds); therefore, all subsequent analyses were 
collapsed across these variables. 
Collapsing across age and gender groups and disparity conditions, participants 
selected the superior option (i.e., that with a superior probability of success) on 
slightly over half of the total sessions (M = .577, SD = .197; See Table 7).  
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Table 7 
 
Means and standard deviations of the proportion of trials participants 
selected the superior option in the experimental choice phase, per age 
group,gender, trial block, and disparity condition. 
 
Age Group  
     5-6-year-olds .595 (.228)
     7-8-year-olds .550 (.154)
     9-10-year-olds .589 (.202)
Gender  
     Male .577 (.188)
     Female .577(.207) 
Trial Block  
     Trial Block 1 .566 (.188)
     Trial Block 2 .588 (.205)
Disparity Condition  
     Disparity Condition1 .543 (.197)
     Disparity Condition2 .591 (.198)
     Disparity Condition3 .597 (.192)
Overall .577 (.197)
 
Note: N = 80 
 
  
            52
The primary analysis was a 3 age group (5-6 years, 7-8 years, 9-10 years) X 2 gender 
X 2 trial block (first or second block of ten experimental choice phase trials) X 3 
contrast disparity condition (P1 - P2 = .1, .2, .3) mixed model ANOVA, with age and 
gender analyzed between-subjects, contrast disparity condition and trial block 
analyzed within-subjects, and button preference throughout the experimental choice 
phase sessions as the dependent measure (i.e., the number of times the participant 
chose the option with the superior probability of success, per ten trials, per disparity 
condition). This analysis revealed a significant main effect for trial block, F(1, 74) = 
5.24, p = .025, 1-β = .618; participants selected the superior option more frequently in 
the second than the first trial block. A significant main effect also emerged for 
disparity condition, F(2, 148) = 5.16, p = .007, 1-β = .820, with a simple main effect 
between the first and second disparity conditions, F(1, 74) = 9.33, p = .003, 1-β = 
.854. There was also a significant interaction between disparity condition and trial 
block, F(2, 148) = 3.81, p = .024, 1-β = .686 (See Figure 4).  
Figure 4. The mean frequency with which participants selected the superior option, 
per trial block and disparity condition. 
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In the highest and lowest disparity conditions (i.e., P1 - P2 = .1 and .3) performance 
improved across trial blocks (i.e., participants picked the superior over the inferior 
alternative more frequently in the second than the first trial block); however, 
surprisingly, this was not the case in the middle disparity condition (i.e., participants 
actually selected the superior over the inferior option more frequently in the first trial 
block in the P1 - P2 = .2 condition). The main effects and all potential interactions for 
age and gender, however, were non-significant (See Figure 5). 
Analyses of each individual participant’s selections were conducted to assess 
whether the above trends were consistent across participants. The binomial theorem 
determined that selecting either option on 72 of the 120 total trials was the significant 
difference criterion (assuming α < .05). In contrast to the response patterns observed 
in Study 1, a fair number of participants (23 participants, 29%) selected the more 
probable option more frequently than expected by chance. 
 
Figure 5. The mean frequency with which participants selected the superior option, 
per age group and gender. 
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Conversely, only one participant selected the less probable option more frequently 
than expected b y chance. This suggests that consistent selection of the superior 
option is not limited to just a few participants, and because the superior option was 
chosen more frequently than expected by chance by substantially more participants 
than the inferior option was, these results suggest relative sensitivity to probability.  
The final analysis considered participant selection in the explicit forced-choice 
measure (i.e., which button Kermit would prefer). Collapsing across age groups, 
genders, and disparity conditions, participants responded that Kermit would prefer the 
superior option (i.e., that with a superior probability of success) on just over half of 
the total sessions (M = .560, SD = .497; See Table 8). Responses on this measure 
were significantly correlated with selection of the superior option in the experimental 
choice sessions; however, as was the case in Study 1, this correlation was only  
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Table 8 
 
Mean proportion of accurate prediction on the forced-choice Kermit 
preference measure, per age group and disparity condition. 
 
Age Group  
     5-6-year-olds .506
     7-8-year-olds .569
     9-10-year-olds .616
Gender  
     Female .550
     Male .572
Disparity Condition  
     Disparity Condition1 .531
     Disparity Condition2 .569
     Disparity Condition3 .581
Overall .560
 
Note: N = 80 
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moderate, R (480) = .199, p < .001. A 3 age group (5-6 years, 7-8 years, 9-10 years) 
X 2 gender X 3 contrast disparity condition (P1 - P2 = .1, .2, .3) mixed model 
ANOVA was conducted, with age and gender analyzed between-subjects, contrast 
disparity condition analyzed within-subjects, and the number of times participants 
predicted Kermit would prefer the superior option as the dependent variable. As 
Table 8 and Figure 6 illustrate, accuracy in predicting that Kermit would prefer the 
superior option improved with age; however, the analysis revealed that this effect was 
non-significant, F(2, 74) = 2.12, p = .128, 1-β = .421, as were all other main effects 
and interactions. 
 
Figure 6. Accuracy in forced-choice measure per age group. 
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Discussion 
The current results are reasonably consistent with recent studies that have found 
that even relatively young children attend to, and adjust preferences based upon, 
probability (Acredolo et al. 1989; Kuzmak & Gelman, 1986; Schlottmann & 
Anderson, 1994; Schlottmann, 2001). Whereas previous studies tend to present 
participants with perceptually visible and static probabilistic gambles (e.g., “view this 
spinner, tube, or array of counters”), however, the current task revealed that children 
are relatively sensitive to underlying, imperceptible, and time-variant probabilities. 
Not only did participants select the more probable option more frequently than the 
less probable option, a fair number of participants selected the superior option at a 
rate greater than expected by chance.  
Another interesting aspect of the results was that there were significant differences 
between disparity conditions (i.e., participants were more likely to select the more 
probable option over the less probable option when the two had a larger disparity in 
probability of success), and trial blocks (i.e., participants were more likely to select 
the more probable option over the less probable option in the second set of 10 choice 
trials). Each of these findings might be attributed to uncertainty. At the outset, 
participants were not informed that one button had a higher probability of success 
than the other. This, of course, is why it was predicted that more disparate conditions 
would require less sensitivity to probability than would less disparate conditions, and 
that selection would improve with prolonged trials, which the results supported.  
Moving on, as mentioned in the introduction, contemporary studies have produced 
results that are not entirely consistent with classic studies, typically by revealing that 
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children are able to process probability earlier in development than the classic 
approach presumed. However, contemporary studies of the development of 
probability understanding have differed from classic approaches both in terms of the 
response mechanism used to gauge “understanding,” and in terms of what qualifies as 
“understanding.” Regarding the former, it was proposed that perhaps some of the 
differences between the contemporary and classic studies might be attributed to the 
response mechanism that each employs. Whereas classic studies have largely relied 
on forced-choice response (i.e., what is the most likely outcome of the current 
gamble? which of two gambles do you prefer?) contemporary studies have relied on a 
far richer mechanism that asks the child to estimate a degree of preference with a 
given gamble. Regarding the latter, whereas classic studies have adopted a rigid 
theoretical perspective that requires explicit demonstration of probability 
understanding, contemporary studies have adopted a theoretical perspective that 
qualifies graded and implicit demonstration of probability use as “understanding.” 
The current studies were designed to tease these issues apart by including both a 
forced-choice measure (i.e., which option would Kermit prefer?) and a metric for 
more intuitive preference (i.e., button selection throughout the choice phases of the 
task). There are three theoretically rooted patterns of data that could emerge with 
these dual measures: 1) Younger participants might fail on both measures (i.e., select 
the more and less probable options in each pair with equal frequency, and predict 
Kermit would prefer either option with equal frequency), 2) Younger participants 
might succeed on both measures (i.e., select the more probable option over the less 
probable option, and predict Kermit would prefer the more probable option over the 
  
            58
less probable option), or 3) Younger participants might succeed on one measure (i.e., 
intuitively select the more probable option more frequently than the less probable 
option), and fail on the other (i.e., explicitly predict Kermit would prefer either option 
with equal frequency). If the pure classic approach provides the most accurate 
explanation, and children do not understand probability until later childhood, we 
would expect data pattern 1. If children are simply more competent than the classic 
approach presumed, we would expect data pattern 2. If, however, the argument that 
different measures lead to different results and variable theoretical interpretations is 
most accurate, we would expect data pattern 3. This third pattern is the best fit with 
the obtained data. Whereas there was minimal developmental variance in selection 
during the experimental choice phases (i.e., the youngest participants actually 
selected the more probable option slightly more frequently than the older 
participants), there was a linearly increasing developmental pattern in the forced-
choice measure. Although this developmental effect on the forced-choice measure 
was non-significant, it was apparent that the youngest participants (i.e., five- to six-
year-olds) selected the more probable option more frequently in the choice trials than 
they predicted Kermit would prefer the more probable option (i.e., 59.5% of trials vs. 
50.6% of forced-choices). That said, the different measures do lead to different 
results. With a more intuitive measure younger children are more able to demonstrate 
sensitivity, and development appears to proceed from implicit to more explicit ability; 
however, which is more indicative of probability “understanding” is truly a 
theoretical issue.  
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In discussing Study 1 it was mentioned that children, and particularly younger 
children, seem to neglect the quantitative outcome value associated with a decision-
making alternative, but attend to its probability of success. The current study further 
supports this conclusion; whereas there was a significant age effect in selection of the 
option with higher outcome value in Study 1, there was not a significant age effect in 
selection of the more probable option in the current study. Furthermore, across ages, 
participants selected the more probable option over the less probable option in the 
current study more frequently than those of Study 1 selected the higher outcome 
value option over the lower outcome value option. Future research could further 
exploit this issue by increasing the complexity of the task, and pit probability of 
success against outcome value (i.e., implement conditions in which options with 
higher probability of success are pitted against options with higher quantitative 
outcome values, options with moderate probability of success are pitted against 
options with moderate outcome values, and options with low probability of success 
are pitted against options with low outcome values). Another possibility would be to 
implement a condition that involves greater than one potential non-zero outcome. 
This was exactly the strategy used in the following study, in that wins were combined 
with losses, rather than zero value outcomes. 
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Chapter 5: Study 3 – The Child’s Sensitivity to Loss 
The current study, for most intents and purposes, is a replication of Study 2, with 
one added manipulation; it also considers the child’s sensitivity to risk.  As discussed 
in the introduction, risk-taking is defined as behavior that entails some probability of 
loss. In this sense, although Studies 1 and 2 were investigations of the child’s 
sensitivity to uncertain elements in a decision-making task, neither study tapped the 
child’s sensitivity in a risky situation, where choices could produce losses. The 
current study was explicitly designed to do just this because each button press that did 
not result in a win resulted in a loss of points. Furthermore, although Study 1 allowed 
analysis of quantitative outcome value differences, and Study 2 allowed analysis of 
probability of success, by supplementing wins with losses the current study allows 
analysis of probability of success with two non-zero outcome values.  
Methods 
Participants 
The Institutional Review Board at the University of Maryland approved the 
current methodology for soliciting child participation (IRB/HSR Protocol 
Identification Number: 04-0498). All participants had parental permission and 
assented to participate.  The sample consisted of 77 kindergartners, first-, second-, 
third-, and fourth-graders who were recruited from a kindergarten affiliated with the 
University of Maryland at College Park and suburban Maryland private elementary 
schools (Mage = 7-years-10-months, SDage = 1-year-6-months; 44 female, 33 male). 
For analytic purposes the participants were categorized into three age groups (26, 5-6-
year-olds; 28, 7-8-year-olds; 23, 9-10-year-olds; See Table 9). 
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_____________________________________________________________________ 
Table 9 
 
Number of participants per age and gender category. 
 
Gender 5-6 Years 7-8 Years 9-10 Years Total 
Female 13 17 14 44 
Male 13 11 9 33 
Total 26 28 23 N = 77 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Materials 
Again, five options were paired to produce 6 different experimental contrasts 
(Outlined in Table 10). The contrasts that were drawn were identical to those in Study 
2; however, wins were supplemented with losses rather than non-wins. The five 
options differed in probability of success, but all point transactions (e.g., wins and 
losses) had a common value (V1 = 5 points, V2 = -5 points): 
P1 = .3, P2 = .4, P3 = .5, P4 = .6, P5 = .7 
Again, there were two contrasts where the probability of winning differed by .1, two 
contrasts differed by .2 and two contrasts differed by .3 (See Table 10). Unlike Study 
2, two of the options (those with P = .3 and P = .4) are comparatively risky because 
losses are more probable than wins. In this sense, participants may not only prefer an 
option with a higher probability of success because it leads to more frequent wins, but 
also because the options with a higher probability of success have a lower probability 
of loss. Thus, while the probability disparities between contrasts in the current 
experiment are identical to those drawn in Study 2, there is a two-fold increase in the 
expected value disparity between the currently contrasted options. Therefore, it is 
expected that this manipulation will magnify the results obtained in Study 2, and that  
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_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Table 10 
 
Contrasts selected to assess the child’s sensitivity to options with different 
probabilities of success, holding outcome value constant, EV = V (2Pw – 1). 
 
Contrast* Vx, Vy Px, Py Vx - Vy Px - Py EVx - EVy  
1b 5 vs. 5 0.4 vs. 0.5 0 0.1 1.0 
2 b 5 vs. 5 0.5 vs. 0.6 0 0.1 1.0 
3 b 5 vs. 5 0.3 vs. 0.5 0 0.2 2.0 
4 b 5 vs. 5 0.5 vs. 0.7 0 0.2 2.0 
5 5 vs. 5 0.3 vs. 0.6 0 0.3 3.0 
6 5 vs. 5 0.4 vs. 0.7 0 0.3 3.0 
 
*Note: The presentation of the contrasts followed a fixed random schedule, in 
the following order: Contrast 5, 1, 4, 6, 2, 3. 
b Note: Contrast makes explicit use of a standard reference (V = 5, P = .5). 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
participants will develop a preference for the more probable options, particularly 
when contrasts are more disparate, to even a greater degree than in Study 2. It was 
also predicted that even younger children would select the probabilistically superior 
option more frequently than the inferior option, but that older children might be more 
likely to form an explicit cumulative preference (as assessed by the forced-choice 
measure). In any event, it is proposed that the current study will more precisely reveal 
the development of children’s decision-making abilities in situations of potential loss.  
Procedure 
Data collection took place during regular school or during after-school hours in 
familiar rooms adjacent to the participants’ classrooms, in each of six data collection 
sites. The experimental protocol was the same as in the previous experiments. 
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Results 
The same series of analyses that were conducted in Studies 1 and 2 were again 
used (i.e., preliminary analyses, experimental choice analyses, individual selection 
analyses, and forced-choice analyses). Preliminary analyses revealed that option 
selection did not vary by data collection location (i.e., where the data were collected), 
by randomly assigned option characteristics (i.e., the color randomly assigned to each 
button by the computer program, and whether the first option appeared right or left of 
the center of the computer screen), or the total amount of time that children took to 
complete the experiment (Mtime  = 8-minutes, 14-seconds, SDtime = 2-minutes, 44 
seconds), and therefore all subsequent analyses were collapsed across these variables. 
Collapsing across age and gender groups and disparity conditions, participants 
selected the superior option (i.e., that with a superior probability of success) on over 
half of the total sessions (M = .590, SD = .199; See Table 11). A 3 age group (5-6 
years, 7-8 years, 9-10 years) X 2 gender X 2 trial block (first or second block of ten 
experimental choice phase trials) X 3 contrast disparity condition (P1 - P2 = .1, .2, .3) 
mixed model ANOVA with age and gender analyzed between-subjects, contrast 
disparity condition and trial block were analyzed within-subjects, was conducted. The 
number of selections of the superior options, per trial block and disparity condition, 
throughout the experimental choice sessions was the dependent measure. This 
analysis revealed a significant main effect for trial block, F(1, 71) = 9.76, p = .003, 1-
β = .869; participants selected the superior option more frequently in the second than 
the first trial block. There was also a significant main effect for disparity condition, 
F(2, 142) = 11.08, p < .001, 1-β = .991, with a simple main effect which  
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_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Table 11 
 
Means and standard deviations of the proportion of trials participants 
selected the superior option in the experimental choice phase, per age group 
and disparity condition. 
 
Age Group  
     5-6-year-olds .592 (.204)
     7-8-year-olds .597 (.187)
     9-10-year-olds .585 (.209)
Gender  
     Female .597 (.195)
     Male .582 (.204)
Trial Block  
     Trial Block 1 .574 (.190)
     Trial Block 2 .609 (.207)
Disparity Condition  
     Disparity Condition1 .543 (.204)
     Disparity Condition2 .606 (.195)
     Disparity Condition3 .626 (.190)
Overall .592 (.199)
 
Note: N = 77 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
demonstrated greater selection of the superior option in the third than the first 
disparity condition, F(1, 71) = 19.65, p < .001, 1-β = .992. The main effects for age 
and gender were non-significant; however, a significant interaction emerged between 
disparity condition, age group, and gender, F(4, 142) = 3.23, p = .014, 1-β = .820 
(See Figure 7). Although this interaction was quite unsystematic, it appears that 
although 7-8-year-old males and females selected similarly across disparity 
conditions, 5-6-year-old males selected the superior option more frequently than 5-6-
year-old female in the middle disparity condition, and 9-10-year-old females selected 
the superior option more frequently than 9-10-year-old males in the same disparity 
condition. 
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Figure 7. Age X Gender X Disparity Condition interaction in option selection. 
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Analyses of each individual participant’s selections were conducted to assess 
cross-participant consistency. The binomial theorem determined that selecting either 
option on 72 or more of the total 120 trials was the significant difference criterion 
(assuming α < .05). A substantial number of the participants in the current study (31 
participants, 40%) selected the more probable option significantly more frequently 
than chance, whereas no participants selected the less probable option more often 
than expected by chance. These results suggest that consistent selection of the 
superior option is not limited to a small subsection of the current sample, and that 
participants were relatively sensitive to probability in a decision situation with loss. 
The final analysis considered selection in the explicit forced-choice measure (i.e., 
which button Kermit would like more). Collapsing across age and gender groups and 
disparity conditions, participants responded that Kermit would prefer the superior 
option on over half of the total sessions (M = .580, SD = .494; See Table 12). 
Responses on this measure were significantly, but only moderately, correlated with 
selection of the superior option in the experimental choice sessions, R (462) = .180, p 
< .001. Another 3 age group (5-6 years, 7-8 years, 9-10 years) X 2 gender X 3 
contrast disparity condition (Pw1 – Pw2 = .1, .2, .3) mixed model ANOVA was 
conducted, with age and gender analyzed between-subjects, contrast disparity 
condition analyzed within-subjects, and the number of times participants accurately 
predicted that Kermit would prefer the superior option as the dependent variable. As 
was the case in Studies 1 and 2, the analysis revealed no significant main effects; 
however, a significant interaction between disparity condition and age group  
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_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Table 12 
 
Mean proportion of accurate prediction on the forced-choice Kermit 
preference measure, per age group and disparity condition. 
 
Age Group  
     5-6-year-olds .564
     7-8-year-olds .637
     9-10-year-olds .529
Gender  
     Female .595
     Male .561
Disparity Condition  
     Disparity Condition1 .604
     Disparity Condition2 .610
     Disparity Condition3 .526
Overall .580
 
Note: N = 77 
 
 
emerged, F(4, 142) = 2.94, p = .023, 1-β = .778. Surprisingly, as Figure 8 illustrates, 
participants in the youngest and oldest age groups were more accurate in predicting 
Kermit would prefer the superior option in the condition of minimal disparity than the 
other disparity conditions, and 7-8-year-olds demonstrated a highest degree of 
accuracy in the .2 disparity condition. 
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Figure 8. Age X disparity condition interaction on Kermit preference measure. 
 
 
 
Discussion 
The results of the current study were largely consistent with those of Study 2. 
Across ages, participants selected the options with greater probability of success more 
frequently than those with lesser probability of success. Further, participants were 
more likely to select the option with greater probability of success in instances of 
greater probability disparity, and in the later trial block. What is most surprising, 
however, is that the current results did not magnify those of Study 2. Supplementing 
wins with losses rather than non-wins produced a two-fold increase in the expected 
value discrepancy between the options contrasted in the current study over those 
contrasted in Studies 1 and 2. This led to the prediction that participants would select 
the more probable options substantially more frequently in the current study than in 
Study 2; however, this prediction seems to have not been met. Collapsing across age 
groups, participants did select the more probable option slightly more frequently in 
  
            69
the current study than was the case in Study 2 (i.e., 59.0 % of trials vs. 57.7% of 
trials); however, this difference was not nearly as substantial as was expected. 
Interestingly, because the implementation of loss trials increases the number of 
quantitative outcome values involved, drawing comparisons between Study 2 and the 
current study further supports the argument that children tend to neglect quantitative 
outcome values, as was found in Study 1.   
Also surprisingly, the current study failed to replicate the finding in Study 2 that 
different dependent measures produce different results. Whereas Study 2 revealed a 
linear developmental increase in selection of the more probable option on the forced-
choice measure, the current study found no such evidence. In fact, the oldest 
participants in the current study appear to be the least accurate in predicting that 
Kermit would prefer the more probable option when asked to make a forced-choice. 
Furthermore, participants were surprisingly poor in predicting that Kermit would 
prefer the more probable option in the condition of maximum disparity (i.e., when the 
probability of success in the more probable option was .3 greater than that in the less 
probable option). Perhaps even more surprising, the oldest participants appeared to 
have had the most trouble with the condition of greatest disparity (i.e., the 9-10-year-
olds predicted Kermit would prefer the more probable option in less than half of the 
.3 disparity condition sessions). Given the inconsistencies between Study 2 and the 
current study, performance on forced-choice vs. sequential selection measures must 
be explored further. 
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Chapter 6: Cross-Study Analyses 
The results reported above were not entirely consistent with what was predicted. 
Contrary to the predictions made, it seems that processing of probability information 
may developmentally precede processing of quantitative outcome value information. 
That is, although there were age-based improvements in selecting a quantitatively 
higher valued option over a lower valued option (i.e., Study 1), there were really no 
age trends in selection of a more probable option over a less probable option (i.e., 
Studies 2 and 3; See Table 13). In this sense, participants in the current studies seem 
to have adopted a strategy of neglecting outcome values in favor for attending to 
probability of success, particularly the youngest participants (e.g., 5-6-year-olds). 
A series of cross-study analyses were conducted to further probe these results. As 
introduced, each study made explicit use of a centralized standard alternative; 
specifically, in each study, four contrasts were drawn against an option that was 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Table 13 
 
Cross-study means and standard deviations of the proportion of trials 
participants selected the superior option in the experimental choice phase, per 
age group and disparity condition. 
 
 Study 1a 
Outcome Value
Study 2b 
Probability 
Study 3c 
Probability w/ Loss
Age Group    
     5-6-year-olds .489 (.225) .595 (.228) .592 (.204) 
     7-8-year-olds .540 (.183) .550 (.154) .597 (.187) 
     9-10-year-olds .528 (.194) .589 (.202) .585 (.209) 
Overall .518 (.203) .577 (.197) .592 (.199) 
 
a Note: N = 89 
b Note: N = 80 
c Note: N = 77 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
  
            71
associated with .5 probability of success and a quantitative outcome value of 5 points 
per win. For instance, in Study 1, an alternative that resulted in 3 points per win was 
contrasted against the standard that resulted in 5 points per win, each with .5 
probability of success. Similarly, in Study 2 an alternative with .3 probability of 
success was contrasted against the standard with .5 probability of success, each of 
which resulted in 5 points per win. In expected value terms, these examples are 
equivalent contrasts, and this structural similarity might be exploited to perform 
cross-study comparisons.  
The adopted strategy involved an analysis of the rate at which each participant 
selected each alternative option over the centralized standard (V = 5, P = .5). These 
selection rates were plotted against the alternative characteristic (i.e., if the alternative 
involved 3, 4, 6, or 7 points, or .3, .4, .6, or .7 probability of success). Lines-of-best-
fit were then plotted through these alternative X selection rates plots, and the slope of 
these lines were used as a summary of each participant’s selection (See Figure 9 for a 
graphical example of this plotting strategy, and See Figure 10 for the mean alternative 
vs. standard selection data). With this plotting strategy, a positive slope, which 
emerges when participants select the standard over the lower alternatives (i.e., select 
5 over 3 and 4) and select the higher alternatives over the standard (i.e., select 6 and 7 
over 5), is indicative of adaptive selection, whereas a zero or negative slope is 
indicative of no preference or maladaptive selection, respectively.  
These cross-study slopes data were analyzed with a 3 age group (5-6 years, 7-8 
years, 9-10 years) X 2 gender X 2 trial block (first or second block of ten 
experimental choice phase trials) X 3 experiment (Study 1, Study 2, Study 3) mixed 
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model ANOVA, with age, gender, and experiment analyzed between-subjects, and 
trial block analyzed within-subjects. The dependent measure was each participant’s 
slope of the alternative vs. standard line-of-best-fit. The analysis revealed a 
significant main effect for experiment, F(2, 228) = 9.99, p < .001, 1-β = .984 (Mstudy 1 
= .009, SDstudy 1 = .068; Mstudy 2 = .045, SDstudy 2 = .067; Mstudy 3 = .051, SDstudy 3 = .056). 
 
 
Figure 9. Graphical example of cross-study slope plotting analyses. 
 
 
Example: Study 2, Participant Number 10, 2nd Block of 10 choice trials
     Selected (.3, 5) over (.5, 5) on 3 of 10 trials -  
     Selected (.4, 5) over (.5, 5) on 5 of 10 trials -  
     Selected (.6, 5) over (.5, 5) on 10 of 10 trials -  
     Selected (.7, 5) over (.5, 5) on 7 of 10 trials -  
    Line-of-best-fit, Slope = .13 
 
 
  
            
  
Figure 10. Alternative vs. standard means, per study, age group, and trial block. 
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Bonferroni controlled post-hoc analyses revealed significant differences between 
Study 1 and Study 2, t (167)= -3.48, p = .001, and Study 1 and Study 3, t(164) = -
4.36, p < .001; the slopes were significantly greater, and thus selection more adaptive, 
in Studies 2 and 3 than in Study 1. There was also an experiment X age group 
interaction, F(4, 228) = 2.64, p = .035, 1-β = .733 (See Figure 11). The youngest 
participants under performed the other age groups in Study 1, the middle age group 
participants lagged behind the other age groups in Study 2, and the oldest participants 
were below the younger age groups in Study 3. All other main effects and interactions 
were non-significant. 
 
 
Figure 11. Mean slopes of alternative vs. standard lines-of-best-fit, per study and age 
group. 
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Chapter 7: General Discussion 
Based largely on tenets of classic behavioral decision theory, the current studies 
analyzed age differences in sensitivity to quantitative outcome values and 
probabilities of success in a basic decision-making situation. Several contemporary 
studies have demonstrated that young children (i.e., five- to seven-year-olds) are 
relatively sensitive to quantitative outcome values (Schlottmann, 2000; 2001; 
Schlottmann & Anderson, 1994), and can intuitively use probability information to 
form preferences (Acredolo et al. 1989; Kuzmak & Gelman, 1986; Schlottmann, 
2001; Schlottmann & Anderson, 1994). Recent studies have also demonstrated that 
appreciation of risk and uncertainty improves from the preschool years (i.e., three-
years), into early childhood (i.e., 5-6-years), through adolescence, and into adulthood 
(Byrnes et al. 1999; Byrnes & McClenney, 1994; Crone & van der Molen, 2004; 
Crone et al. 2003; Ernst et al. 2003; Garon & Moore, 2004; Kerr & Zelazo, 2004).  
Child performance on the current task did not dramatically depart from child 
performance in comparable sequential choice tasks (e.g., Crone & van der Molen, 
2004; Garon & Moore, 2004; Kerr & Zelazo, 2004). For instance, whereas Garon and 
Moore (2004) found that six-year-old participants selected an advantageous option in 
an adapted version of the Iowa gambling task on an average of 52% of total trials, 
five- and six-year-old participants across the current studies selected the higher value 
or more probable option on an average of 56% of trials. Similarly, although they did 
not report exact means, Crone and van der Molen (2004) found that six- through 
twelve-year-olds selected the advantageous options on 50-60% of all trials in their 
adaptation of the Iowa gambling task. There are, however, notable differences 
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between the design of the current studies and even these most comparable sequential 
decision tasks; most importantly, whereas these previous studies are relatively 
complex (i.e., outcome values and probabilities of success were allowed to covary), 
the current studies allow disentanglement of sensitivity to quantitative outcome 
values, sensitivity to probability, and sensitivity to risk.  
In this regard, the current studies revealed that although even young children are 
sensitive to probability of success, they have a tendency to neglect quantitative 
outcome values, and in a similar vein, do not substantially increase sensitivity to the 
probabilities involved with a decision with an increase in risk. There are four primary 
findings that support the conclusion that participants were using a probability-over-
outcome value strategy. First, in Study 1, which directly analyzed sensitivity to 
quantitative outcome values, participants tended to select either option with near 
equal frequency, and few participants selected the option with a higher quantitative 
outcome value more frequently than expected by chance. Second, participants in 
Studies 2 and 3 selected the more probable option more frequently than the less 
probable option, and furthermore, a substantial number of participants selected the 
option with higher probability more frequently than expected by chance. Third, the 
cross-study slope analyses revealed that participants were significantly more likely to 
select the superior alternative in Studies 2 and 3, where superiority was a function of 
probability of success, than in Study 1, where superiority was a function of 
quantitative outcome value. Fourth, there were no significant differences between 
Study 2 and Study 3, which involved similar manipulations of probability, but with 
different outcome value control.  
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These findings are actually quite consistent with some adult behavioral decision 
research. Tversky, Sattath, and Slovic (1988), for instance, argued that people tend to 
abide by a compatibility principle, with which probability holds prominence over 
other attributes in choice situations, and in essence, probability looms larger than 
monetary gains. In neglecting outcome values, and attending to probability of 
success, the children in the current studies, and particularly those in the youngest age 
group, seem to have used this very strategy. One direction future studies might go 
would be to plot the relative increment in probability that is equivalent to a given 
change in outcome value. This could be accomplished with the above used 
methodology by drawing comparisons between alternatives that have either greater 
quantitative outcome value contrast disparity or lesser probability of success contrast 
disparity than used above. In this sense, future studies might determine precisely the 
degree to which probability looms larger than quantitative outcome values.  
Given the obtained pattern of results, it is important to contemplate possible 
explanations, and ask why participants, and particularly younger participants, were 
sensitive to probability of success, but largely neglected quantitative outcome value? 
One possibility is that younger populations (i.e., 5-6-year-olds) have accumulated 
greater general experience processing probability than quantitative outcome values in 
their everyday lives. As is standard for behavioral decision research, the current study 
conceptualized outcome values quantitatively, in terms of the number of points 
participants could win by selecting an alternative in a decision pair. Such a design is 
reliant on the assumption that participants are familiar with numeric figures (e.g., “3,” 
“4,” and “5”), and can make quantitative distinctions (e.g., “5” < “6” < “7”). As 
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reviewed, previous research has found that preschoolers (i.e., two-and-a-half- to five-
years) are capable of drawing quantitative comparisons, making basic non-verbal 
calculations, and enacting various numerical principles (Gelman & Gallistel, 1978; 
Huttenlocher et al. 1994; Levine et al. 1992; Mix, 1999; Mix et al. 2002). Some even 
propose that infants are capable of making small set quantitative comparisons and can 
perform very basic quantitative calculations (Antell & Keating, 1983; Starkey & 
Cooper, 1980; Strauss & Curtis, 1981; Wynn, 1992; 1998). In contrast, the current 
results revealed that even five- and six- year olds have some difficulty attending to 
quantitative differences in outcome values in a probabilistic decision-making task. 
Perhaps these results emerged because children simply are not as familiar with 
quantitative outcome values as they are with probability. Clearly, future studies 
should more explicitly explore the relationship between sensitivity to quantitative 
outcome values in decision-making situations (as analyzed in Study 1), and the 
development of more basic quantitative skills. Furthermore, future research should 
attempt to reconcile these differences, perhaps by making quantitative decision 
outcomes more salient, or by analyzing discrimination of quantitative outcome values 
in decision situations in the context of more advanced quantitative skills. Future 
studies may also consider the effects of individual differences in basic quantitative 
developments, and examine effects on sensitivity to quantitative outcome values in 
probabilistic decision situations. 
Another potential explanation for the current results also implicates experience; 
however, this explanation shifts focus from experience with general processing of 
probability and value information to processing probability and value information on 
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the current task. The current task was designed to sequentially expose children to 
probability of success, and it was argued that this design is preferable over 
alternatives because it captures the fact that actual decision probabilities are not 
immediately perceptible, are time-variant, and underlie experiences. In this sense, 
perhaps participants succeeded on the task when probability was manipulated because 
said manipulation captured probabilistic variability as children regularly experience 
it, thus enabling familiar processes. Conversely, the task presented participants with 
perceptually visible and static outcome values (i.e., “You won V points!”). Outcome 
values that are experienced as the result of actual decisions, however, are perhaps as 
time-variant, imperceptible, and underlying as are the probabilities of success 
associated with actual decisions. Thus, the results may reflect the fact that 
probabilities in the current task are relatively synonymous with actual decision 
probabilities, as children have experienced them, but outcome values in the current 
task are a bit different from true outcome values that children have experienced. 
Another related potential explanation for the obtained results also deals with the 
task design. Perhaps control of probabilities in the sensitivity to outcome value 
experiment is nonequivalent to control of outcome values in the sensitivity to 
probability experiments. That is, whereas it was very obvious in Study 2 that outcome 
values were being held constant (i.e., every time a participant experienced a win they 
were shown “You won 5 points!”), it was far less obvious in Study 1 that probability 
of success was being held constant. In this sense, to choose effectively from trial to 
trial in Studies 2 and 3, participants only really needed to attend to probability of 
success, by virtue of the fact that outcome value was obvious. In order to choose 
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effectively in Study 1, however, participants actually needed to attend to both the 
quantitative outcome value and probability of success associated with each 
alternative, because the constancy of probability of success was less obvious. In other 
words, Study 1 may have actually involved an assessment of sensitivity to probability 
of success and sensitivity to outcome value, whereas Study 2 may have, as planned, 
amounted to an assessment of sensitivity to probability. As a result of this issue, these 
findings might be better taken as evidence that although even young children are 
sensitive to probability, there is development of an ability to integrate sensitivity to 
probability and sensitivity to outcome value.  
A key line of evidence, which strongly supports this proposal, is the forced-choice 
preference measure (i.e., the Kermit preference measure). The forced-choice measure 
was included to provide a more explicit assessment of probability and outcome value 
understanding. As discussed specifically above, Study 2 revealed that whereas there 
were no developmental differences in preference across the selection trials, there were 
slight developmental differences in response on the forced-choice measure. 
Interestingly, the developmental pattern in forced-choice response in Study 2 is nearly 
identical to that of Study 1 (See Tables 4 & 8, and Figures 3 & 6). In this sense, 
although selection on the experimental choice phases of Study 1 and Study 2 may 
have elicited slightly different processes, selection on the forced-choice measure 
appears congruent across studies (i.e., it required more explicit integration of 
probabilities and outcome values in each case).  The fact that the correlations between 
experimental choice phase selection and forced-choice selection were similarly 
moderate across studies (i.e., R ≈ .20) further supports the argument that there is 
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something of a transition from implicit processing of probability information, as 
assessed by experimental choice phase selection, towards more cumulative and 
explicit integration of probability and outcome value information, as assessed by the 
forced-choice selection. In the very least, these findings collectively demonstrate that 
it is imperative that future studies take into account both dependent measures that tap 
into strictly controlled decision-making components, and the cumulative and explicit 
integration of those components.  
Finally, the findings described are most certainly tentative, and it is necessary that 
future studies replicate and further explore the issues addressed prior to drawing firm 
conclusions. One major issue is that the participants in the current studies were 
predominantly socio-economically privileged (i.e., all were students at private 
elementary schools). Studies have, however, revealed that lower socioeconomic status 
(SES) groups tend to attain lower scores on standardized mathematics exams (Crane, 
1996; Reyes & Stanic, 1988). Due to the fact that mathematic operations and the 
current decision-making processes involve similar processing requirements, the 
performance of the current upper SES sample may not be representative of all SES 
groups. Therefore, this is an issue future research should most certainly address. Also, 
the studies presented were entirely cross-sectional, and ideally, the developmental 
trends should be explored longitudinally. It would be exceptionally interesting to 
monitor whether or not sensitivity to probability is as stable, as well as whether or not 
sensitivity to quantitative outcome values developmentally increases, throughout the 
childhood years as the current studies suppose. 
  
                           82        
Appendix 1 – Experimental Procedural Protocol 
Appendix 1A – Assent Script 
The following script appeared after participant characteristics were entered, in order 
to verify the child was willing to participate. 
• Today, if you want to, we’re going to play a game. 
• The University of Maryland likes this game. 
• The game takes a few minutes to play, but you can stop playing the game 
whenever you want. 
• You don’t have to play the game if you don’t want to. 
o Do you want to play the game?  
 Yes – Leads to participant characteristics screen. 
 No – Leads to program exit screen. 
 
Appendix 1B – Instructions  
The following instructions appeared on the screen, and were read to participants. 
• We're going to play a game today called the "Light up Game." In this game 
you can push buttons to win and lose points. 
• When you push one of the buttons, the light the button is connected to might 
Light-UP. 
• If you push a button and its light turns on, you win points. 
o Study 1 & 2: But if you push a button and its light doesn't turn on, you 
don’t win points. 
o Study 3: But if you push a button and its light doesn't turn on, you lose 
points. 
• So you need to try really, really hard to win as many points as you can. 
o The Participant was then be asked, “Do you understand?”  
 Yes, he proceeded to the control questions screen 
 No, he proceeded to the alternate instructions screen. 
 
Appendix 1C – Alternate Instructions 
The following instructions appeared if the child indicated he did not understand the 
general instructions, or if either of the control questions was responded to incorrectly. 
 
• Okay, when the Light-Up game starts, you are going to see buttons, and each 
button will be connected to a light. 
• The whole game is for you to choose which button you want to press. 
o Study 1 & 2: If you push a button and its light turns on, you win 
points. If you push a button and its light doesn't turn on, you don’t win 
points. 
o Study 3: If you push a button and its light turns on, you win points. If 
you push a button and its light doesn't turn on, you lose points. 
o So try really, really hard to win as many points as you can.  
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